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Abstract 
Studying the Securitization of Migration in Theory at the Level of the State, 
the Individual, and the EU, and Empirically in Language, Public Perception, and 
Legislation at the National Level in Greece. 
(Under the direction of Liesbet Hooghe, Gary Marks and Graeme Robertson) 
This thesis studies the challenges in dealing with the securitization of 
migration theoretically at the level of the state, the individual, and the EU, and 
empirically at the national level, in particular with regards to the legislative process in 
Greece concerning legislation passed by the Greek Parliament on March 16th 2010 
titled “Contemporary provisions for Greek citizenship and the political participation 
of expatriates and legally residing immigrants and other provisions”. The focus turns 
to what informs state understanding(s) of and reactions to immigration, and how the 
process within the European Union influences these matters. This thesis will also 
examine to what extent the language used in dealing with migration is increasingly 
that of security. It will look at the veracity of Securitization theory in informing our 
specific understanding of the development of migration policy/legislation, its 
implications for state and legislative development, and effects on public opinion. 
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Introduction 
 
‘The Union is founded on the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human 
rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law, principles which are common to 
the Member States.’ (Article 6(1) of the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty) 
 
The first section of the thesis falls into three parts. I will begin to approach the 
debate identifying key concepts: immigration, the state, the individual, and the EU 
and theorize about the tension between security and the individual, and apply this 
thinking to the specific issue of migration. I will then turn to and address a particular 
evolution in the securitization debate with regards to placing interest on human 
security, instead of state security. 
Next, I set out examining securitization theory and look at the interplay 
between state security and the individual. I will start with a focus on state security; in 
this frame, migration is perceived as a threat to national and European security. Since 
the issues are framed in terms of threats to the state –to the EU state as well as to the 
national state– this part will review arguments about the direction of causality 
between EU and national levels: are ensuing policies at the EU level a result of a 
bottom-up process whereby the member states project their policies onto the 
European forum, or is it the other way around? 
The third component of this section will focus on human security as an 
alternative theoretical construct that can shed light on the challenge of migration. The 
virtue of human security as a construct is that, while remaining in the security and 
securitization sphere, it places foremost interest on humans instead of the state. 
Finally, I will examine the interplay between the EU’s common policies, particularly
   2 
in the field of foreign relations, and the securitization of migration policy, and will 
also look into where state and human security concerns meet, by visiting the idea of 
“doing no harm” with policies, vis-à-vis migrants and neighboring states. 
The second section of the thesis shall form the empirical approach to the 
subject. I will examine the law that the Greek Parliament debated, and then voted 
upon and eventually passed in full on March 16th 2010 titled “Contemporary 
provisions for Greek citizenship and the political participation of expatriates and 
legally residing immigrants and other provisions”. I will also analyze the 
parliamentary debates pertaining to it, in both cases in search of securitization and/or 
the 'politics of unease'. The analysis will be set in the general climate of language 
used, public opinion, and the legislative process. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
1.1 Immigration, the state, the individual, and the EU 
The issue of immigration in Europe is important for Europe’s future. An 
increasing number of citizens express their concern on immigration; a concern that 
may come from either side of the spectrum of views, either negative expressing anti-
immigrant views, or positive expressing pro-migration or pro-protection when it 
comes to thinking about refugees (if and when this is the case). Responding to these 
voices from society, political parties adapt or promote their policies on immigration in 
order to tend to their constituents’ needs and fears, true or perceived; thus 
immigration as a topic has shaped or influenced political discourse and reaction 
policies across Europe. Former APSA president Robert Putnam says that ‘puzzling 
over big issues like these on the minds of our fellow citizens, as immigration, could 
move our discipline forward, as it has in the past’.1  
It has been suggested2 to be in the interest of European countries to take in 
more immigrants in growing numbers, in order to provide a solution for problems 
arising from low fertility rates and retiring workers that take their toll on labor forces 
and welfare states. Despite this suggestion they appear not to be doing so and instead 
voices to control and limit immigration are raised and echoed across Europe. 
Immigration concerns add to the debate over European security and insecurity, 
inclusion and exclusion, and influence EU relations its neighbor countries. 
Theoretically the subject of immigration has given rise, to studies on 
multiculturalism or tolerance in societies, identities, competition or conflicts,
                                                        
1
 Hochschild, Jennifer L. (2005), p.315 
2
 More than relying on our own intuition which would suggest a similar approach, such 
suggestions have been raised by the European Commission with communications, policy 
plans and proposed common agendas, economists and officials at the EU, the World Bank or 
the OECD, think tanks, journalists and diplomats among others  
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inclusion or exclusion, and security politics. Normatively, many institutes search to 
survey and study the subject so as to propose policies and solutions.3  
‘Immigration has already become a major political issue, and is often linked in 
the mind of the public to the increase in criminality. It is therefore not 
surprising that justice and home affairs ministers have been meeting all too 
frequently… immigration will remain a hot political issue, and much will 
depend on how the economic situation develops’.4  
Other considerations and arguments stem from and revolve around linking 
immigration and responses to it, to domestic culture, conservatism and xenophobia. 
Furthermore, a “Fortress Europe” idea and mentality may be growing at the expense 
of those less fortunate to be living outside the Union’s borders or trying to cross into 
them, accentuating a notion of inner us versus outer them.5 
The power of people’s movement is evident in the history of mankind, as 
migration has shaped a great part of registered history. The development of the 
national state altered the situation of the movement of people from natural, or 
unabated, to unnatural, or managed. In an organized fashion it would either thus 
restrict free movement, or encourage and speed up migration, as with the historical 
examples of the immigrant accepting countries of the new world or post-War Europe. 
‘One key change in the twentieth century was the move by governments towards 
regulating migration.’6  
                                                        
3
 Such as the Commission with the European Demographic Forum, the Migration Policy 
Institute, the Bertelsmann Foundation, and the German Marshal Fund (with its recent 
Transatlantic Trends: Immigration public opinion survey) among others; msnbc for example 
has a section dedicated to Islam in Europe in its World News department. More surveys on 
the subject become increasingly available by the Eurobarometer, or national polling or 
statistical organizations. 
4
 Tsoukalis, Loukas (2005), pp.241-242 
5
 Linklater, Andrew (2005), pp.384-385 
6
 Newman, Edward (2003), p.3 
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Most modern state theories agree on the elements that have come to comprise 
our understanding of state sovereignty.7 Three concepts are central: land (state) and 
sovereignty over it, the monopoly on the means of violence (coercion) over the 
population residing in it, and the responsibility of protecting (policing) this 
population. The state needs to arrange its functions, know who its citizens are, 
regulate the flow of people in its interior and those coming from the exterior; it has to 
exercise control, thus managing the movement of people. 
Countries have nationals and non nationals, citizens and non citizens within 
their territory. They also have nationals residing beyond their national state borders. 
States usually find it easier to claim more rights for the benefit of their own citizens 
when found abroad, than that which they habitually offer to foreigners inside their 
borders –a double standards approach. States may maintain that it is in their national 
interest to be left alone in dealing with matters of their interior –sovereignty 
argument, or to demand protection of the rights of their own people in foreign 
countries, while not definitely guaranteeing those of alien citizens in their land, or for 
that matter even allowing entrance in it, in the first place. A case of ‘Special 
Obligation’8, this stems from a consideration of an inner ‘us’ versus an outer ‘them’, 
with the tipping of the scale in favor of the ‘us’. 
In the post-Cold War western world and under an altering security 
environment, a plethora of challenges emerged to the state’s exclusive power to 
coerce and police, ranging on one hand from environmental concerns and nuclear 
proliferation, organized crime, irregular migration, human trafficking and terrorism9, 
to the privatization of the domain of security provision.10 On the other hand the 
emergence of an ‘increasingly communitarized European police/law enforcement 
                                                        
7
 Bruggeman, Willy (2002), p.260 
8
 Frost, Mervyn (2002), p.28 
9
 Carrera, Sergio and Geyer, Florian (2007) 
10
 Bruggeman, Willy (2002), p.260 
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sphere’11, adds to the loss of – or sharing of the state’s sovereign security role with 
supranational European institutions. 
Within the European Union the state has partially ceded its sovereignty with 
regard to borders and control. This is a consequence of the free movement of 
European Union citizens. With regards to the now common European border, the 
European ‘state-in-the-making’ can be expected to strengthen its policing and control 
(although not yet by pooling resources12) targeting outsiders, in order to sustain the 
internal open borders. The abovementioned can be extrapolated to the European level 
as well, as at least institutionally (if not in the eyes of the publics) since the Schengen 
agreements, there is an inner ‘us’, which is allowed to travel freely, whereas outer 
borders are strengthened to keep the outer ‘them’, out.  The “Fortress Europe” idea 
and mentality appears to be growing at the expense of those living outside the 
European Union’s borders, or trying to cross into it.13 
Over the past recent decades there has been an increase in the number of 
immigrants, refugees and asylum seekers that have come to Europe.14 This movement 
has generally been one of economic interest in search of better conditions of life and 
work, and has been guided towards western and northern Europe, particularly towards 
Germany15, France and the United Kingdom including both Europeans along with 
other people from Asia, Africa and the Middle East.16 With the turn of the new 
century and the ongoing conflicts in these regions and especially the Middle East and 
Afghanistan the number of asylum seekers and immigrants has risen significantly. 
                                                        
11
 ibid., pp.260-261 
12
 Frontex the EU agency based in Warsaw, was created as a specialised and 
independent body tasked to coordinate the operational cooperation between Member States in 
the field of border security. The activities of Frontex are intelligence driven. Frontex 
complements and provides particular added value to the national border management systems 
of the Member States (http://www.frontex.europa.eu/) 
13
 Linklater, Andrew (2005), pp.384-385 
14
 Weldon, Steven A. (2006), p.331 
15
 Vachudova, Milada Anna (2000), pp. 154-6 
16
 Muller, Jerry Z. (2008), p.32 
   7 
Public perception and reception for these people has been negative although they may 
perform vital services for the host economies.17 
 ‘Concern over immigration into Europe is not a new phenomenon.’ The end of 
the cold war, the wars in the Balkans along with more recent wars in the Middle East 
and Afghanistan have generated increased strains on member states. Border countries 
in particular, such as Greece, Italy and Spain along with the island member states of 
Cyprus and Malta, are dealing with ever increasing numbers of asylum seekers along 
with growing flows of immigrants. The Schengen agreement brought down the 
internal borders of the European Union thus facilitating member state citizen’s travel. 
Additionally it enticed criminal networks intending to further their illegal activities 
including the smuggling of immigrants and human trafficking, growing both in scope 
of operations and sophistication of means, methods and routes to undermine borders 
and security in Europe.18 These have been among the most prevalent (national) 
security concerns of border member states, but not solely limited to them. 
Participation in the EU and the Schengen treaty has brought about a largely 
unimpeded movement for people, capital, services and goods. It is the information the 
state has about its citizens and the sharing of it with other states, that guarantees this 
freedom of movement. Technology has acted as a great facilitator for this joint effort, 
especially in the field of gathering and sharing information. The state acts as a 
sponsor for its citizens and guests, to participate in a wider European community of 
citizens and member states. At the passport control what counts is the issuing country 
–sponsor of the passport or identity card. This collaboration was not easy or 
instantaneous in conception and achievement. Member states were initially weary of 
renouncing their exclusive right of information, control and regulation, but as time 
has proven difficulties were overcome.  Now the target for mining information has 
shifted collectively towards those wishing to enter the Union. 
Moving away from the consideration of the state, this process has empowered 
the European citizens. It has enabled them to send and receive capital and 
                                                        
17
 Weldon, Steven A. (2006), p.331 
18
 Rees, Wyn (2005), p.213 
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investments, travel without internal border controls, extend their market reach for 
products, use a strong single currency for sixteen of the member states, all at a level 
not known before. A legal overarching framework exists, that acknowledges and 
establishes both practices of civil society promotion and protection, along with a 
union of democratic states, covering and protecting civilian as well as citizenship 
rights. The borders are open and people are free to move, work, study and reside, 
outside their particular country’s borders, with the same rights, privileges and 
obligations as if they were in it. On the other hand, the aforementioned process has 
disempowered and keeps disempowering those outside the borders of the Union. An 
indicative example is, would-be asylum seekers turned back at the border. 
‘Confronting’ these ‘powerless immigrants’ comes at ‘a very high price for liberal 
democracies’ incurring ‘both economic and ethical costs’.19 
What is furthermore of concern, is what takes place at these borders, both on a 
figurative or discourse level and in practice. Andrew Geddes once again elaborately 
posits that Europe’s borders are not the same as they used to be before European 
integration20, as the nature of European sovereignty has been altered. ‘By the late 
1990s, the debate on Europe’s jurisdictional architecture appeared to settle in favour 
of the view that European integration had transformed a network of sovereign 
national states into a system of multilevel governance (…).’21 As the nature of 
European sovereignty changed so did the understanding of one of sovereignty’s basic 
tenets -the border. Territorial borders where not as relevant for the interior of the 
Union, but remained points of reference and entry for those coming in; organizational 
borders have evolved to meet immigration at the market, welfare and citizenship; and 
conceptual borders emerge as a sense of community and identity, which meet 
immigrants for their integration to the host society.22 
                                                        
19
 Sassen, Saskia (2008), pp.1-3 
20
 Geddes, Andrew (2005), pp. 789-790 
21
 Hooghe, Liesbet and Marks, Gary (2008), p.113 
22
 Geddes, Andrew (2005), pp. 789-790 
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It has been proposed that the high level of social interaction amongst the most 
mobile parts of the European population, which also benefits from the processes of 
European integration and loose internal borders, produces a heightened sense of 
European identity for them23, thus strengthening the idea that a new European ‘us’ has 
been developed and is developing. Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks further inform us 
that ‘national identities do not speak for themselves in the world of politics, but must 
be framed, cued or primed’, they can be multiple and ‘not necessarily zero-sum’ … 
(and) … ‘are shaped by discourse’.24 ‘The way identity bears on European integration 
depends on how it is framed, and it is framed in domestic political conflict.’25 This is 
illuminating as it demonstrates the link between the European and the domestic and 
shows how the former is rooted in the latter. Additionally for our understanding it 
may hint at how, in the issue of regarding immigrants as foreign to Europe and/or to 
European identity, the source is again with the domestic. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
23
 Fligstein, Neil (2008), particularly Chapter 5 
24
 Hooghe, Liesbet and Marks, Gary (2008), pp. 119-120 
25
 (ibid.) 
  
1.2 Security, Migration Securitization, and the EU 
 
“Your humanitarian work is used, or rather abused, as a substitute for political 
action to address the root causes of mass displacement. You have become part 
of a “containment strategy”, by which the world’s more fortunate and powerful 
countries seek to keep the problems of the poorer at arm’s length. … And how 
else can one explain the contrast between the generosity which poor countries 
are expected to show, when hundreds of thousands of refugees pour across their 
frontiers, and the precautions taken to ensure that as few asylum seekers as 
possible ever reach the shores of rich countries?”26 
 
At this point it would be useful to revisit the quote provided above from former 
United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan. The very use of the words 
“containment strategy” is very illustrative of states’ growing tendency to frame the 
issue of people movement in ‘security’ terms and especially so, as the former 
Secretary General points, in order not to accept people in their territory, even if it 
involves the most vulnerable of these people, the refugees/asylum seekers.  
The essence of security in international relations is survival and an issue is 
securitized when it is ‘presented as an existential threat to a designated referent 
object’. Habitually this referent object is ‘the state, incorporating government, 
territory and society’.27 In the domain of state politics ‘existential threats are 
traditionally defined in terms of the constituting principle–sovereignty, but sometimes 
                                                        
26
 Former United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan. Quote found in Newman (2003), p.6 
27
 Buzan, Barry, Waever, Ole and de Wilde, Jaap (1998), p.21 
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also ideology–of the state. Sovereignty can be existentially threatened by anything 
that questions recognition, legitimacy, or governing authority.’28   
‘“Security” is the move that takes politics beyond the established rules of the 
game and frames the issue either as a special kind of politics or as above 
politics. Securitization can thus be seen as a more extreme version of 
politicization. In theory, any public issue can be located on the spectrum 
ranging from nonpoliticized (meaning the state does not deal with it and it is 
not in any other way made an issue of public debate and decision) through 
politicized (meaning the issue is part of public policy, requiring government 
decision and resource allocations or, more rarely, some other form of 
communal governance) to securitized (meaning the issue is presented as an 
existential threat, requiring emergency measures and justifying actions outside 
the normal bounds of political procedure).’29 
As Ole Waever eloquently posits, ‘one can view ‘security’ as that which is in 
language theory called a speech act: … it is the utterance itself that is the act … By 
saying ‘security’ a state-representative moves the particular case into a specific area; 
claiming a special right to use the means necessary to block this development.’30 
Language is used to securitize the issue to allow for certain (defensive and 
exclusionary) state reactions to it. ‘With the speech act approach, the focus is on the 
security argument, and it will be with reference to sovereignty for the securitizing 
state.’31 
Barry Buzan and Ole Waever deftly present us with ten securitizations that 
have taken place at the post–Cold War, European Union core of Europe (indicatively 
quoted but shortened):  
                                                        
28
 ibid., p.22 
29
 ibid., pp.23-24 
30
 Buzan, Barry (1991), p.17 
31
 Buzan, Barry, Waever, Ole and de Wilde, Jaap (1998), p.151 
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1. ‘The strongest security discourse in post-Wall Europe has been the argument 
that Europe has to avoid to return to its own notorious past of wars and power 
balancing, and therefore integration is a necessity. (…)’ 
2. The other main security argument is the reverse of the first. European 
integration itself may come to be perceived as a threat, primarily to national 
identity. (…)’ 
3. ‘Local conflicts (…)’ 
4. ‘‘Ethnic conflict’ (…)’ 
5. ‘Instability in Russia and the Mediterranean (…)’ 
6. ‘Globalisation and immigrants (…)’ 
7. ‘Terrorism, international organized crime, drug trafficking, and illegal 
immigration (…)’ 
8. ‘Environmental security (…)’ 
9. ‘Global terrorism, regional conflicts, extra-European environment, and 
infectious diseases (…)’ 
10. ‘Traditional state-to-state securitisations play a surprisingly marginal role 
(…)’ 32  
Of these, some are most important to our exploration. ‘European integration 
itself may come to be perceived as a threat, primarily to national identity’ and is 
usually confounded and bundled with populist passions against immigrants or 
refugees, and aliens in general.33 Ethnic conflict in parts of Europe is framed as a 
security concern, at times with regards to the actual or potential threat of refugee 
flows from the conflict zones to the European Union.34 Globalization is often tied to 
immigration and referred to, also as mentioned above, as a threat to national identity, 
independence and welfare; this in turn allows for a cycle of the securitization of 
immigrant integration in the host countries. Moreover, the criminalization of 
migration methods into Europe as a result of smuggling networks and human 
trafficking, further adds to immigration being perceived as a security concern and 
                                                        
32
 Buzan, Barry and Waever, Ole (2003), pp.356-361 
33
 (ibid.) p.356 
34
 (ibid.) p.358 
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threat.35 Furthermore, if the issue of the survival of the state is presented as depending 
on its socio-economic survival (both for the receiving country as it is perceived 
straining its resources, and for the sending country as depleting its human resources), 
then migration may come to be considered by it as a security issue.36 
The securitization of migration in Western Europe began with the emphasis 
put on ‘public order and preservation of domestic stability’, and on the ‘challenge to 
the welfare state and to the cultural composition of the nation’, in the 80’s and early 
90’s with the Schengen Agreement and Convention, along with its connecting 
‘immigration and asylum with terrorism, transnational crime and border control’. It 
continued with emphasis put on ‘the need for restrictions of population flows’ like 
with the Dublin Convention and EURODAC fingerprint database’s asylum 
application discouraging character in the 90’s, and with Dublin II (Regulation) in the 
2000’s. It has carried on since at the European Union level, with the moves towards a 
Common European Union Immigration Policy and Common European Asylum 
System, such as with Tampere in 1999,37 and up to the Hague Programme of 2004, 
the European Pact on Immigration and Asylum adopted at the October 2008 Brussels 
European Council, or the Stockholm Programme of 2009.38 It seems safe to say that a 
‘europeanization’ of (foreign) policies in dealing with migration is coming more and 
more into play. 
Wyn Rees summarizes well this argument and advances our reflection to its 
treatment at the European level when saying that: 
                                                        
35
 (ibid.) p.359 
36
 Newman, Edward (2003), p.4, and Noll, Gregor (2003), pp.279-282 
Another consideration worth examining elsewhere is to turn this thought around, where it 
may be deemed a survival issue for a country if it does not invite immigration as its 
population is ageing and its numbers are declining also causing strains on its welfare state. 
The answer to which problem could lie with migration and integration in order to rejuvenate 
the ageing state and its economy. Welfare issues also come into Barry Buzan and Ole 
Waever’s deliberations (2003, p.359) 
37
 Huysmans, Jef (2000), p.756-757 
38
 The European Commission’s Justice and Home Affairs and Eurasylum webpages on 
Immigration and Asylum & Council official documents weblinks 
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‘Challenges from international terrorism, transnational crime and illegal 
immigration have been elevated to a level whereby they are discussed as 
security threats to the European space. The actors responsible for activating 
and obtaining legitimacy for this security discourse (Buzan, Waever and de 
Wilde 1998) have been a mix of both representatives of national governments 
– interior ministry officials and law enforcement officers – and officials from 
the EC/EU.’39 
Central to this consideration is that the European Union is externalizing the 
internal security concerns of its member states, when producing agreements, common 
policies and in dealing with its external relations.40 That is to say, the Union has been 
using its dominant core-to-periphery securitizing position in order to attract new 
members and by framing the securitization debate to its advantage, it also dictates it to 
its neighbors, especially so with regards to Eastern European ones.41 ‘EU cooperation 
with third countries has increasingly reflected the needs of its own internal security 
agenda.’42 On security issues ranging from: the ‘fight against crime, the combating of 
international drug trafficking or migration, the EU has embedded internal security 
objectives into foreign policy agreements’43 and enlargement.44  
Movement in this direction thus far seems to be a result of ‘national 
projection’45, where in a bottom-up function Member State concerns have been 
projected to the Union level. ‘(A)nalyses of European cooperation in asylum and 
immigration matters(…) highlighted the interplay between domestic politics and the 
                                                        
39
 Rees, Wyn (2005), p.208 
40
 Boswell, Christina (2003), pp. 619-620 
41
 Buzan, Barry and Waever, Ole (2003), pp.364-368 
42
 (ibid.) p.218 
43
 (ibid) 
44
 Tsoukalis, Loukas (2005), p.242 
45
 Terms in quotations from Wong, Reuben (2005), pp. 136-142 
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developing European agenda(…); the shift ‘upwards’ towards transgovernmental 
cooperation’ was attributed though to ‘venue shopping’.46 
In view of this mobility, an increase in ‘adaptation and policy convergence’ 
along with ‘policy isophormism’ is anticipated.47 Referring to the (already from 2005) 
European Council’s decision on the EU’s ‘commitment to a Global Approach to 
Migration’, Squire and Huysmans maintain that ‘political concerns regarding security 
and migration have (evidently) shifted beyond the state to the transnational or global 
level.’48 An ‘identity reconstruction’49 is emerging, where both mobile elites and 
publics begin sharing norms and definitions on what national and European concerns 
and interests consist of.  
Additionally, this has certainly also led to ‘national adaptation’50 (a top-down 
approach) as exemplified by joining and adhering to the obligations stemming from 
the Schengen Agreement. ‘The special European Council meeting in Tampere in 
1999, on the ‘development of an area of freedom security and justice emphasized that 
the candidate Member States must take on the Schengen aquis’ following its prior 
incorporation in it after the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997. There, for example,   
‘the security continuum (an institutionalized mode of policy-making that 
allows the transfer of the security connotations of terrorism, drugs traffic and 
money-laundering to the area of migration) (was) extended from the 
development of the internal market to the enlargement of the EU to central and 
eastern European countries’.51 
                                                        
46
 Lavenex, Sandra and Wagner, Wolfgang (2007), p.228 
47
 Terms in quotations from Wong, Reuben (2005), pp. 136-142 
48
 Squire, Vicki and Huysmans , Jef (2009), p.5 
49
 Terms in quotations from Wong, Reuben (2005), pp. 136-142 
50
 Terms in quotations from Wong, Reuben (2005), pp. 136-142 
51
 Huysmans, Jef (2000), p.760-761 
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Jef Huysmans further states that ‘the linking of internal and external borders of the 
European Community has played an important role in the production of a spillover of 
the socio-economic project of the internal market into an internal security project’. 
The unequivocal formalization of spillover came with the ‘introduction of the Third 
Pillar on Justice and Home Affairs in the Treaty of the European Union’ in 1992.52 
The European Union had been increasingly using its pressure mechanisms of 
aid and, more than ever, accession to this effect, essentially rendering the pre-
accession Central and Eastern European countries a “buffer zone” which would “gate-
keep” the European core, safeguarding it from the unwanted migrants as they 
accepted and implemented the aquis communautaire and strengthened their own 
border protection mechanisms under the provisions of the Schengen Agreement.53 
This also had an additional effect of allowing the core western European Union 
member states to shy away from their obligations of international protection towards 
asylum seekers and refugees. Based on the “safe third country principle” and the 
readmission agreements54 they returned asylum seekers and immigrants to these 
acceding members thus relegating their international responsibility towards 
protection. The situation remains the same today as all members continue the same 
policies they were taught, applying them in turn to their “new” neighbors. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
52
 ibid., p.760 
53
 Vachudova, Milada Anna (2000), pp. 161-164 
54
 (ibid) p.9 & Boswell, Christina (2003), p.620 
  
1.3 Beyond state and towards human security 
 
 “State security should no longer be narrowly interpreted in terms of 
protecting territory against external threats, but must also include the protection of 
citizens. The focus should, therefore, be on ensuring the safety of people, or human 
security.”55 
‘We need another profound transition in 
thinking –from nuclear security to human security’56 
 
Conventional western proponents of strategic securitization theory, tend to 
focus almost exclusively on the state, and the implications of migration for its 
sovereignty and national security, as well as policy formation options. But this is just 
one side of the argument on the migration/security nexus; ‘in contrast to these 
strategic analyses of migration and security, analysts of human security focus 
attention on the security of the individual over that of the state’.57  
One of the people that have made this point is Edward Newman. He gives 
several reasons for considering the frameworks within International Relations (IR) to 
be ‘inadequate to deal with contemporary conflicts and international relations’ 
ranging from migratory flows of people, to morality and the changing nature of 
examining and defining international security.58 ‘Attitudes and institutions that 
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privilege ‘‘high politics’’ over disease, human rights, hunger or illiteracy are 
embedded in international relations and foreign policy decision making.’59 Human 
Security is the next step in the evolving nature of the concept of security bringing the 
focus for policy making, form the idea of solely defending state territory against a 
foreign threat or enemy, to ‘ensuring the safety of the people’ of the state, ’as the 
fundamental and ultimate function of sovereignty.’60 
‘Human security is concerned with the protection of people from critical and 
life-threatening dangers, regardless of whether the threats are rooted in 
anthropogenic activities or natural events, whether they lie within or outside 
states, and whether they are direct or structural. It is “human centered” in that 
its principal focus is on people both as individuals and as communal groups. It 
is “security oriented” in that the focus is on freedom from fear, danger and 
threat.’61 
Since there is interest in, and an understanding of the gravity of migration, 
why is it at the periphery and not the centre of international politics? This 
consideration goes in line with the argument posited by Mervyn Frost in the 
contemplation of Human Rights issues in International Affairs. Human Rights 
discourse, he tells us, if not pressed to the boundaries of IR theory, is certainly not 
considered central to it and is at times stepped upon and dismissed.62 But people are 
using the Human Rights language both in favor and against Human Rights, so for one 
to propagate or negate Human Rights, the knowledge of them is presupposed.63 In our 
case vis-à-vis migration this is also evident; individual threat considerations have 
been marginalised in the dominant discourse of International Relations theory, that of 
the Realist paradigm which gives priority to state centric considerations of security 
and international relations. 
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The two are not necessarily incompatible; analytically there are gains to be 
made from a focus on human as well as state security. Consideration shows that sole 
focus on state security by military means may come at the expense of personal 
security and wellbeing, which in turn shall come to threat the existence and survival 
of the state. Citizens who are safe in the traditional sense of national security (that is 
not facing a threat of attack from another state or actor), can still be ‘perilously 
insecure in terms of the threats to the lives of individual human beings in every day 
reality.’64 All these are threats that if not dealt with at the individual level, shall draw 
a burdensome cost to the societal, political and economic functions of the state and its 
relations with other states, so we recognize a link between human and state security. 
‘Non-traditional security challenges can and do spill over territorial borders and cause 
a range of wider security threats and sources of instability’ say Ramesh Thakur and 
Edward Newman and add that ‘human security threats are interdependent and very 
much an international concern.’65  
Squire and Huysmans provide a counterargument stating that ‘despite its 
widespread pragmatic and normative appeal, a focus on human security is of limited 
effect in radically re-framing of migration’. Quite the contrary, they contend that 
although useful as a tool to help hold liberal democracies accountable to their values, 
human security approaches, along with the strategic ones, come to ‘consolidate the 
articulation of migration as a security ‘threat’’, exactly by one way or another 
anchoring it in this same framing/discourse.66 Their step forward beyond the 
migration/security nexus emerges from critical security studies, whereby the framing 
of the questions, of the discourse, is decoupled from security. ‘Security is conceived 
less as a value to aspire to as it is conceived of as a constitutive mediator of the 
relation between mobility and politics’. ‘Rather than being the central focus, it enters 
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as one among other issues that impacts on, shapes, and constrains mobility’, thus 
allowing migration to be decoupled from the essence of ‘threat’.67 
‘But some philosophers argue that the failure to rescue can cause harm by 
inviting the vulnerable to conclude that the question of whether they survive or perish 
is of no concern to those who are able to help them.’68 
Turning to the European Union level, a conceptual equivalent comes in the 
form of the concern to “do no harm” with measures and policies. It is a fine line to be 
crossed for the European civilizing process to turn towards the de-civilizing, as 
‘civilizing processes simultaneously check aggressive inclinations and create new 
possibilities of violence and domination’.69 While Member States in their relations, 
‘can satisfy their needs without “destroying, frustrating, demeaning or in other ways 
harming each other” over and over again’70, this statement must be tested against 
time, and checked against fears of using its own sense of community and power in a 
harmful manner. How could it do harm, when it is in itself a project of removing harm 
from the equation of interstate and inter-communitarian relations? Harm may come 
intentionally or unintentionally.71 With regards to the former it is considered 
unthinkable for the EU to cause harm to its own citizens or to other countries or 
communities. The latter is more troubling, since its unintentional nature may make it 
undetectable, or detected (and fixed) late. These considerations echo the concluding 
remarks of the previous two parts, drawing attention to the ‘powerless immigrants 
confronted by powerful states’, and the ‘gate keeper’–‘buffer zone’ policies pushed 
further out with EU expansion. 
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2. Migration Securitization, the clouding language, Greek public opinion and 
parliament. 
This second section of the thesis presents my empirical case: how has 
migration been securitized within the public and political sphere in Greece? I will 
examine the law that the Greek Parliament debated, and then voted upon and finally 
passed in full on March 16th 2010 titled “Contemporary provisions for Greek 
citizenship and the political participation of expatriates and legally residing 
immigrants and other provisions” [coded as l. (law) 3838/2010]. I will also focus the 
analysis on the parliamentary debates pertaining to it, in both cases in search of 
securitization as the ‘politics of exception’ and/or the 'politics of unease'. The 
examination will be placed in the general climate and understanding of the language 
used, along with, public opinion, and the legislative process, keeping in mind to what 
extent the language used in dealing with migration is increasingly that of security. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
2.1 Introduction  
The question is to what extent deliberation over immigration policy, at the 
national level fits within the securitization discourse, with the levels of analysis being, 
language, public perception and opinion formation, “the letter of the law”, and the 
parliamentary debates –or how the ‘party line’ is voiced and recorded. The working 
hypotheses are that public perception is influenced by the securitization discourse; 
that the multiplicity and confusion of terms to describe migration accentuate or even 
initiate it; and that the framing of the issue in terms of state security will be more 
prominent on the right side of the political spectrum. 
In order to investigate whether this is true, I will be looking for three basic 
elements of securitization, –the presence of Language, Measures, and (demand for) 
Leeway, in perceiving, discussing and politicizing migration. To what extent is 
security language used for framing the debate in policy formulation, policy 
explanation (selling it to the public) and public perception, as an existential threat? 
Note that while I understand and accept the Copenhagen School’s speech act, which 
sees the framing of the issue in security language as enough proof of its securitization, 
I will also look for measures taken that indicate justification as a state of emergency. 
Further, I will look for evidence that state actors call for (and if present are granted) 
leeway in the political maneuvering, that is leeway to circumvent the normal political 
process. 
Information to evaluate the hypotheses comes from the reading of different 
writings and sources. Initially, focusing on language as a securitizing element we 
discover that one of the root causes of the difficulties in dealing with migration is the 
language used by different actors, such as the state or the media, to frame the subject. 
The language used blurs the issue and acts as fuel to the securitization debate. 
Furthermore, a selective although indicative representation of recent polls and news 
items showcases significant interest on the subject, also as a security concern. Finally, 
following the legislative process of the Hellenic Parliament, I will focus on the key 
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national policy document to be analyzed, the letter of the law “l.3838/2010” 
(“Contemporary provisions for Greek citizenship and the political participation of 
expatriates and legally residing immigrants and other provisions”), along with its 
parliamentary discussions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
2.2 The clouding and securitizing language 
 
“... Emigrate is better than immigrate. Proof: no such thing asillegal emigration. 
Further proof: Emigration is never an election issue.”…72 
 
Earlier in this thesis we encountered Ole Waever’s position that ‘one can view 
‘security’ as that which is in language theory called a speech act: … it is the utterance 
itself that is the act … By saying ‘security’ a state-representative moves the particular 
case into a specific area; claiming a special right to use the means necessary to block 
this development.’73 I would like to suggest that securitization language could come 
from and be present at the level of the public and media as well. 
The existence of many definitions to describe the movement of people, along 
with the expansion of certain definitions at the expense of others, cloud the issue 
either intentionally or unintentionally by the state, the media, or other actors, in order 
to explain certain policies or refrain from enacting others. Terminology obscures our 
understanding as well as the issue as a whole especially within politics, local or 
European and fuels securitization. Smuggle-immigrant(s) is a word in Greek 
commonly used in reference to irregular migrants. It is considered to be derogatory, 
and its use is immediately contested/securitized. 
Greek politicians, media and public, tend to use the words migrant, immigrant, 
emigrant, interchangeably in their vocabulary trying to provide a description for 
nearly the same notion of people movement. Added to these words are those of 
refugee and asylum seeker, which although very clear in the international legal 
documents that describe them, are also used to contribute to the non-clarity of the 
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matter. Greek media in particular, have been seen to be ‘not a securitizing actor per se 
but a ‘functional actor’, who significantly influenced the securitization of migration 
by popularizing the security discourse and reproducing negative stereotypes.’ They 
were essentially seen as channeling a top-to-bottom securitization of what was 
deemed official, from the politicians to the public.74 
Andrew Geddes illustrates how EU member states have rendered legal access 
to asylum seekers virtually impossible in their territories thus ‘creating the category of 
the ‘illegal asylum-seeker’, unknown up until now in international law’75 and 
incompatible with the provisions of the 1951 Geneva Convention and the 1967 New 
York Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees. Beyond the normative 
consideration that nobody should be branded “illegal” the ‘targeted individual may 
not be in fact ‘illegal’ but a potential asylum seeker or refugee.’76 The United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees is further cautioning European states to understand 
that among the mixed migration flows into Europe are people who qualify as refugees 
and are thus in need of their special protection.77  
Designation of transit migrants and countries78 further adds to the opaque 
terminology scenery, as do ‘economic migrants (which) further blur the definitions; 
these are often not clear distinctions. The legal rights of refugees – as refugees and 
also as humans with human rights – are often demonstrably unfulfilled or violated’, 
says Edward Newman.79 Xenophobia, has come to symbolize, mostly in populist right 
wing politics, the fear of the immigrant. Immigrants are tied in the public’s 
perception, abetted also by the populist rhetoric, to criminality80, or even terrorism.81 
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‘Inter-cultural migration may have triggered xenophobic reactions from 
certain segments of the “native population”, thereby adding fuel to ultra-nationalist 
political parties.’82 We can also consider the language used by different individuals or 
parties as similar to this fuel. In this sense, under the usage of many terms, it becomes 
easier to cloud the norms and develop a confusing and dangerous, foreign total of 
“otherness” since their numbers have been exaggerated, with which to brand all others 
as “them” (vs. “us”), as “targets”, “they all are the same”. 
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2.3 Public Perception 
Immigration is a key issue in Greece and remains a hot topic in the forefront 
of news and public opinion. As an increasing number of Greek citizens express their 
concern over immigration, Greek public opinion appears to be among the most 
skeptical in Europe. I will examine this by making use of various opinion polls, 
initially of a more comparative nature and then more focused in Greece. 
A group of experts for the Council of Europe, identify ‘inter-cultural 
migration’ as one of ‘a myriad of external forces (that) today’s governments in 
Europe are assailed with (and which) have changed the context in which liberal 
political democracy operates’.83 It is fair to say that this assumption still holds now, a 
few years later, if not also augmented as a problem. Immigration is a very important 
issue in Europe and remains a very hot topic in Greece as it remains in the forefront of 
news coverage and in the minds of the people, with increasing numbers of citizens 
expressing their interest in and concern over immigration. 
The German Marshall Fund of the United States presented in 2008 and 2009 
the findings from its Transatlantic Trends: Immigration public opinion survey 
gauging public opinion across Europe (seven and six particular countries respectively) 
and the United States (plus Canada in 2009). The 2008 survey results slightly favored 
the consideration of immigration as being problematic instead of an opportunity; 
additionally majorities voiced concerns over illegal immigration, crime and tax 
increase but did not link immigration to terrorism. Majorities also favored: policies 
curbing illegal immigration and deportation, permanent foreign labor programs based 
on certain criteria; anticipated positive cultural influence, and supported Muslim 
integration.84 The 2009 survey results showed that the economy was considered by far 
the most important issue facing the country, and also showed an increase in viewing 
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immigration as problematic, especially from those leaning politically right. Results 
related to labor and legalization were similar to the year before, and new trends show 
majorities in favor of: social benefits for legal immigrants, development aid to reduce 
illegal immigration, and policymaking at the European Union level. Additionally, this 
year included assessment of government policies, which varied, and noticed the 
perception-reality gap regarding immigrant numbers in the country.85 Although 
Greece was in neither survey, the German Marshall Fund is a preeminent source for 
gauging public opinion in Europe, and will act as a bridge for us to look with further 
more relevant polls into the Greek case within Europe. 
In a 2008 study Jack Citrin and John Sides compare what citizens on both 
sides of the Atlantic think about migration. They find that public opinion in the 
United States appears to be more tolerant towards cultural diversity. On the other 
hand, public opinion in both sides of the Atlantic is similar in overestimating the 
number of immigrants in the country and favoring curtailing of immigration.86 When 
trying to explain cross-national variation they find financial, economic, and 
population criteria unrelated to immigration attitudes.87  
They pay special attention to the Greek case (granted, as a form of two 
examples given/chosen to show the antithesis), when asking ‘What for example, 
‘makes’ Greek respondents apparently more unfavorable towards immigration than 
Swedes?’88. Their analysis and figures, show that Greece is probably the most 
difficult audience in their study as indicated by the following : 
Greek public opinion ranks: 
• Top in support for religious and cultural homogeneity, in their ‘Beliefs about 
Societal Homogeneity’; 
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• First for family proximity, second for language, and third in support of 
whiteness in their ‘Beliefs about Qualifications for Immigrants’; 
• Third, amongst a cluster of countries (that is behind the two individual ones 
clear ahead) in misperceiving the number of immigrants in the country, in 
their ‘Perceptions of Immigrant Number’; 
• Top as most concerned for immigration effects on culture, taxes and crime, in 
‘Perceived consequences of Immigration’; 
• Among the top (though not as clear in lead as abovementioned) with regards 
to the correlatory effects in ‘The Relationship between Individual-Level 
Factors and Attitudes toward Immigration’.89 
Using Eurobarometers (EB) 71 (Spring 2009), 72 (Autumn 2009), 73 (Spring 
2010), we will examine and compare in greater detail where EU27 and Greek public 
opinion (EL) stands. In EB 71 we see: 
• EL 61% 〉 EU27 30% ‘disagrees with the notion that people from other ethnic 
groups enrich the cultural life of their country’; 
• EL 78% 〉 EU27 45% ‘citizens believe that the presence of people from other 
ethnic groups is a cause for insecurity’  
• EL 81% 〉 EU27 49% believe that same presence ‘increases unemployment in 
the country’ 
• EL 53% 〉 EU27 37% ‘do not believe that their country needs immigrants to 
work in certain sectors of their economy’ 
• EL 70% 〉 EU27 51% ‘do not believe that immigrants contribute more in taxes 
than they benefit from health and welfare services’ 
• EL 30% 〉 EU27 25% replied that immigration ‘should be emphasized by the 
European Institutions in the coming years, to strengthen the European Union 
in the future’.90 
                                                        
89
 ibid., pp. 38, 40, 41, 44, 47 
90
 Eurobarometer 71 (Spring 2009), p.7 & (accompanying) Key National Indicators Results 
for Greece, p.2 
   30
EB 72 offers two considerations relevant to our search for immigration related 
results in its accompanying ‘Key National Indicators Results for Greece’ charts:  
• Immigration EL 9% 〉 EU27 8% ‘Main concerns facing country’ 
• Immigration EL 4% 〈 EU27 5% ‘Main personal concerns’ 
Compared to previous numbers, these appear quite low and moreover, the latter is the 
first incidence where the EU public opinion percentage is higher. Also in the main 
body we are informed that ‘Immigration is not the main issue in any of the EU 
Member States.’91 These last results are mirrored in EB 73. By the time it was 
conducted the global financial crisis along with the Greek national debt crisis, had 
brought the abovementioned pairs down to lows of EL 3% 〈 EU27 9% and EL 2% 〈 
EU27 3%, with EU27 averages leading in both cases.92 
Certain polls conducted in Greece by Greek polling agencies, during the same 
period of interest from around the middle of 2009 to early 2010 (late 2009 and early 
2010 coincide with the opening of the debate in Greek society regarding then 
proposed law “l.3838/2010”), show high percentages of respondents perceiving 
immigrant presence as a threat.  
Newspaper ‘Kathimerini’ on July 5th 2009, reporting on a poll by ‘Public 
Issue’ cites a ‘Greater concern over immigrants’ and notes a ‘Conservative – negative 
turn in citizens stance’. Indicatively, the numbers reported are: 
• 56% in favor of transporting illegal immigrants to abandoned army barracks 
(but in favor also of providing them with health and schooling services – 
responses indicating care for their living conditions are up from last year) 
• Views that migration probably harms: the country 62%, the economy 52%, 
increases crime 76%  –these numbers, it is reported, have shown an increase 
compared to last year, while concurrently, percentages of negative 
associations when hearing about immigration, have dropped 
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• 72% (up from 65%) think that the national immigration policy is less strict 
than it should be and 47% (up from 33%) think the same about the EU 
policy.93 
 
Newspapers ‘TA NEA’ on December 22nd 2009 and ‘Eleutherotypia’ on 
January 15th 2010 report on a poll by ‘Kapa Research’ citing ‘One out of two Greeks 
view immigrants as a “threat”’ and ‘53%: Give citizenship to children’ respectively. 
Indicatively the numbers from Kapa Research are: 
• 51.6% consider that the presence of immigrants in the country constitutes a 
“threat” 
• 79.3% consider that the immigrants who live in the country are “too many” 
• 57.5% think that immigrants compress wages and increase the unemployment 
of Greeks 
• 53% of Greeks are in favor of citizenship for immigrant children 
• 49.9% in favor of granting them the right to vote 
More than half of respondents think illegal immigrants should leave the country, 7/10 
agree with immigrant access to work and welfare, and 5/10 agree with family 
reunification, 8/10 request punishment for racist behavior and 7/10 agree with the 
slogan “all different – all equal”. 
• 65.3% of immigrants consider “Greece their second homeland” 
• 51.3% have not suffered racist behavior from Greeks 
• 64.7% intend to remain in Greece 
• One out of two want Greek citizenship, 7/10 request the right to vote and 65% 
think well of Greeks 
• 73.4% of immigrants feel “secure” while 65.3% of Greeks feel “in danger 
/insecure” 94 
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The Greek public is amongst, if not atop, the most skeptical in Europe vis-à-
vis immigration. This review of recent polls from different bodies and agencies along 
with the relevant accompanying newspaper articles acted as a gauge for examining 
the security-threat "climate". They point towards the “threat” – “insecurity” feeling in 
the public opinion of Greece that is of interest to us in the securitization analysis. That 
is to say, Greeks tend to overestimate the number of immigrants in the country, which 
indicates a feeling of encirclement that induces notions of: criminality, threat to 
societal and cultural homogeneity, harm to the economy, employment, welfare state 
and the country, and calls for more strict anti-immigration measures and removal 
(either repatriation or encampment with social rights and benefits). 
This is what we acknowledge as the securitizing climate. Moreover, the actual 
threat/insecurity language comes up exactly as such in different surveys: EL 78% 
insecurity in Eurobarometer 71, 51.6% threat and 65.3% in danger /insecure in Kapa 
Research, thus corroborating the presence of the securitization language. In the first 
part of this essay we saw that an issue is securitized when it is ‘presented as an 
existential threat to a designated referent object’. Habitually this referent object is ‘the 
state, incorporating government, territory and society’.95 We also saw that the 
securitization of migration in Western Europe began with the emphasis put on ‘public 
order and preservation of domestic stability’, and on the ‘challenge to the welfare 
state and to the cultural composition of the nation’.96 From the three elements 
suggested in the introduction, the two with relevance to the public, Language and 
(demand for) Leeway are present. It is safe to say that immigration has been 
securitized in the eyes of the public in Greece. 
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2.4 Securitization in Law l.3838/2010 and the parliamentary debates pertaining to it 
I now turn my focus to the legislative process of the Hellenic Parliament, and 
the parliamentary discussions held on March 9th, 10th, 11th and 16th 2010. This is done 
in order to search for securitization and/or 'politics of unease' language during the 
debate about passing what would become “Law l.3838/2010 Contemporary 
provisions for Greek citizenship and the political participation of expatriates and 
legally residing immigrants and other provisions”. 97 
In the previous section we saw that public opinion in Greece was highly 
engaged with the subject of immigration. In the ‘Kappa Research’ polls reported by 
the two Greek newspapers (‘TA NEA’ on December 22nd 2009 and ‘Eleutherotypia’ 
on January 15th 2010), there are two answers of particular interest to our reflection on 
this law, as they tie in with a couple of its provisions: 53% of Greeks are in favor of 
citizenship for immigrant children and 49.9% in favor of granting them the right to 
vote. Their publication timing is of great significance, as they appeared during a 
period when the subject became very politicized. This was in anticipation of the 
draft’s open public deliberation on the internet, and after its conclusion. 
The new government instituted a novelty program of open policy, public 
consultation / electronic deliberation, on draft bill proposals, preceding their 
introduction in parliament.98 This specific deliberation was open from December 28th 
2009 to January 7th 2010. The public’s interest is evident as this deliberation, out of a 
total of ten for the Ministry of Interior, Decentralization and E-government, drew 
3,403 comments out of a total of 14,069 until last update February 28th 2011. 2,458 of 
the comments were made on Article 1, which provides alterations to the ‘l.3284/2004 
Code of Greek Citizenship’. It essentially opens up the criteria for citizenship, 
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especially for foreigners’ children, from a stricter jus sanguinis approach to a jus solis 
one. This is done based on provisions of a child’s birth in the country, combined with 
the parents’ completion of five continuous years of legal residency, or the child’s 
successful completion of six years of Greek school enrollment in Greece.99 
Minister of Interior, Decentralization and E-government Mr. Ioannis 
Ragoussis, introduced the proposed law as a draft Bill to the Standing Parliamentary 
Committee of Public Administration, Public Order and Justice. The Greek Parliament 
debated it in plenum, and then voted upon and finally approved it by majority in its 
entirety between March 9th and 16th 2010. This law entered into force, as indicated in 
its final article (31), with its publication in the Government Gazette on March 24th 
2010. 
‘The legislation initiative lies in the Government, which introduces 
Bills, and the Parliament, which introduces Law Proposals. All laws are voted 
(enacted) in a plenary session. (…) It is mandatory that an explanatory report 
is attached to Bills and Law Proposals, as such report elaborates on the 
purpose of the proposed legislation and indicates the exact wording of current 
legislation to be amended or repealed. (…) Bills must also be accompanied by 
an Impact Assessment Report and by a report on the results of the public 
consultation that took place prior to the submission of the Bill. Furthermore 
Bills and Law Proposals may be transmitted to the Scientific Agency of the 
Hellenic Parliament, which submits a review on the proposed provisions. (…) 
The elaboration and examination of a Bill or a Law proposal includes two 
stages that are at least seven (7) days apart. At the first stage a debate in 
principle and on the articles is conducted and at the second stage a second 
reading takes place followed by debate and vote by article (and in its entirety). 
(…)’100 
The conference of the presidents of the Hellenic Parliament101 decided in their 
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March 4th 2010 meeting that the discussion on the draft law would take place in three 
plenary sessions. They also noted that depending on the number of members of 
parliament registered to take the floor, they would further consider if one day or two 
would be needed to discuss it in principle.102 In fact, it took four sessions in total, 
which were held on the 9th, 10th (debate in principle and vote), 11th (debate on the 
articles and vote) and 16th of March 2010 (second reading and vote in its entirety).103 
Table 2.4.1 Parties and Members in Parliament 
Political parties in the 300-member strong parliament104 after the October 4th 2009 
national elections, and at the time of this particular Bill debate and passing105: 
Party Meaning of acronym Political group of the 
European Parliament 
affiliation 
Number of 
Members of 
Parliament /300 
Percentage 
in last 
elections 
PA.SO.K. Pan-Hellenic 
Socialist Movement 
S&D Progressive Alliance of 
Socialists and Democrats 
160-Ruling 
party 
43.92% 
N.D. New Democracy EPP European People’s 
Party 
91-Leading 
opposition party 
33.48% 
K.K.E. Communist Party of 
Greece 
GUE-NGL European United 
Left-Nordic Green Left 
21 7.54% 
LA.O.S. Popular Orthodox 
Rally 
EFD Europe of Freedom and 
Democracy 
15 5.63% 
SY.RIZ.A. Coalition of the 
Radical Left 
GUE-NGL 13 4.60% 
 
Mr. Ioannis Diamantidis, was the rapporteur for the majority (ruling party 
PASOK) and Mr. Athanasios Nakos for the leading opposition party (ND)106. Their 
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 Hellenic Parliament, Session Minutes, March 9th 2010, p.4720  
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 Hellenic Parliament, Session Minutes, March 9th, 10th, 11th, 16th 2010 
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 The Electoral System is coined as a (Mixed) Enhanced Proportional Representation. There 
is a Barrier Clause of 3% nationally and a 40-seat bonus for the first party.  
105
 October 4th 2009 national elections results. Since then 13 members of parliament have 
declared themselves independent, two new parties have been formed, with certain of these 
independents joining them. 
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parliamentary representatives were Mr. Petros Euthymiou and Mr. Konstantinos 
Tzavaras respectively. KKE named Mr. George Marinos as its parliamentary 
representative and Mr. George Mavrikos as its special speaker for this Bill. LAOS 
named Mr. Athanasios Plevris and Mr. Spyridon-Adonis Georgiadis respectively, 
while SYRIZA named Mr. Nikos Tsoukalis as special speaker.107 
 
After debate of the Bill on principle concluded in the March 10th session, 
LAOS called for roll call vote. Out of 269 votes counted, 170 were in favor (YES 
from PASOK and SYRIZA), 96 were against (NO from ND and LAOS), and 3 
abstained (KKE).108 After wrapping up debate of the Bill on the articles in the March 
11th session, ND requested roll call vote for articles 1, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21 
and 25. LAOS requested roll call vote for articles 1, 2, 14, 17, 21 and 25. All eleven 
roll call votes were bundled in one. 273 votes were counted and allocated as follows: 
 
Table 2.4.2 Roll call vote results on articles 1, 2, 14-21 and 25 (March 11th 
2010 session) 
Article No. YES NO ABSTAIN Total Passed by 
1, 25 168 100 5 273 Majority 
2 157 116 - 273 Majority 
14, 15, 16, 18, 19, 20, 21 173 100 - 273 Majority 
17 157 100 16 273 Majority 
 
All remaining articles up to the final one no.31 were passed by majority vote 
by acclamation, ‘thus the Interior Ministry’s Bill (…) was accepted by Parliament on 
principle and on the articles by majority, and vote in its entirety was postponed for 
another session’.109 In the session of March 16th 2010 the Bill was also accepted in its 
entirety by majority vote by acclamation, ‘thus the Interior Ministry’s Bill (…) was 
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 Hellenic Parliament, Law l.3838/2010 proceedings, minutes, and law document portal. 
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 Hellenic Parliament, Session Minutes, March 9th 2010, pp.4720, 4723 
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 Hellenic Parliament, Session Minutes, March 10th 2010, pp.4826-7, 4849 
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 Hellenic Parliament, Session Minutes, March 11th 2010, pp.4930-1, 4947, 4962 
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accepted by Parliament by majority, in single discussion, on principle, on the articles 
and in its entirety (…).110 
Table 2.4.3.a Party representation/participation in the relevant discussions on 
the Bill as measured by times MPs took the floor allowing for multiples in relevant 
sessions in March 2010 in absolute numbers 
Party Party 
rep./part. 
March 9th March 10th March 11th March 16th No. Members 
of Parliament  
PA.SO.K. 64 14 34 16 n/a 160 
N.D. 45 9 25 11 n/a 91 
K.K.E. 7 4 2 1 n/a 21 
LA.O.S. 32 9 8 15 n/a 15 
SY.RIZ.A. 10 3 5 2 n/a 13 
Total 158 39 74 45 n/a 300 
 
 
Table 2.4.3.b Relative party strength in the relevant sessions on the Bill in March 
2010 as ratio of absolute count to total 
Party Party vocal 
strength 
March 9th March 10th March 11th March 16th Party strength 
in Parliament 
PA.SO.K. .405 .359 .459 .355 n/a .533 
N.D. .285 .230 .338 .244 n/a .303 
K.K.E. .044 .103 .027 .022 n/a .070 
LA.O.S. .202 .230 .108 .333 n/a .050 
SY.RIZ.A. .063 .077 .067 .044 n/a .043 
Total (allow)1.0 (allow)1.0 (allow)1.0 (allow)1.0 n/a (allow)1.0 
 
I would have to agree with Huysmans and Buonfino’s disclaimer that ‘we are 
aware of the limitations of using parliamentary debates as the key entry point into the 
political framing of policy questions in an age of mass media, blogs, focus groups, 
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campaigning and opinion polling’111, since the situation is very similar in Greece as 
well. There is a plethora of resources available that may act as opening the floor to 
different politicizing or securitizing agents. Furthermore, I will also concur with their 
statement that ‘however, the parliamentary debates continue to provide a strong 
institutional locus for researching political positioning among the political elite over 
time.’ 112  
For their specific study on immigration, asylum and terrorism in UK 
parliamentary debates they ‘think it remains important to look in detail at how 
professional politicians render and contest nexuses between migration and 
terrorism.’113 The parliament floor in Greece as well, is probably the most important 
setting where to project political positions. The records of the laws presented and the 
minutes held during debates are also one of the most official forms of maintaining 
political representation, which makes it a fitting tool for our study. 
The first clarification that is needed is that although March 16th is typically 
part of the timeline of the Bill passage, it was just put on the agenda of the session to 
be voted upon in its entirety. This was done so by majority vote by acclamation and 
without further debate, which had closed according to parliamentary procedure on the 
11th, thus there are no relevant parliamentary minute parts for us to consider. The 
relevant parts come down to a total of 168 pages of solid relevant text that is without 
the roll call vote. This is out of the 283 pages total for all three days, or 369 for four 
days, that the Bill was under consideration in Parliament, giving us approximately a 
bit over one page per speaker on the floor. 
The two major parties’ participation in absolute numbers (Table 2.4.3.a) 
follows a similar trend, which peaks on March 10th, the day that wrapped up the 
discussion and vote in principle. This session’s agenda was practically monothematic 
and dominated by discussion on the Bill, providing the densest records. The two 
parties of the Left, KKE and SYRIZA, are also comparable in absolute numbers, with 
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KKE peaking the first day and SYRIZA the second. LAOS, the Right/Far-Right party, 
peaks on the third day, of discussion and vote on articles, with every member present 
and taking the floor. It also recorded the same number of speakers on the first day as 
ND, which has six times the presence in Parliament. 
LAOS rejects being branded a far-right party, and even though they are not a 
single-issue party, immigration, public order, national security and the economy are 
their top concerns. Their participation in the debates was expected to be dynamic 
prior to the start. This was proven from the onset as, even before the majority 
rapporteur Mr. Diamantidis presented and read the Bill, and in breach of procedure, 
Mr. Plevris moved to consider the Bill as unconstitutional. After the reading, the 
motion was heard, and the unconstitutionality claim was raised for articles 14 and 17 
on granting the right to vote and stand for office in municipal elections. After all other 
parliamentary representatives and the minister took the floor in opposition; the motion 
was defeated since the vote by standing up clearly did not gather the necessary 
number to succeed.114 Furthermore LAOS’ party leader was the only one to speak on 
all three days, compared to the leaders of ND and SYRIZA who took the floor once, 
and of PASOK and KKE none. 
Relative party strength in Parliament is calculated as the ratio of absolute 
number of MPs to the total 300. What is termed relative party vocal strength, to 
indicate how much the party has made its presence/participation felt, is calculated as 
the ratio of times party MPs speak to the total 158, and respectively of each day’s 
(Table 2.4.3.b). Taking these into thought we see: 
• PASOK underachieves on all accounts with a vocal strength deficit ranging 
from 7.4% to 17.8%, as its vocal strength never reaches its 53.3% 
parliamentary strength potential. 
• ND’s vocal strength surpasses its 30.3% parliamentary strength only once on 
March 10th by a 3.8% margin, and trails on all other accounts with a deficit 
ranging from 1.8% to 7.3%. 
• KKE’s vocal strength surpasses its 7% parliamentary strength only once on 
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March 9th by a 3.3% margin, and trails on all other accounts with a deficit 
ranging from 2.6% to 4.8%. 
• SYRIZA overachieves on all accounts with a vocal strength surplus ranging 
from 0.1% to 3.4%, as its vocal strength always surpasses its 4.3% 
parliamentary strength. 
• LAOS overachieves on all accounts with a vocal strength surplus ranging from 
5.8% to 28.3%, as its vocal strength always surpasses its 5% parliamentary 
strength. 
Through these results we observe that LAOS’ vocal strength that is its 
presence/participation impact is a game changer. More than a serious outlier, this 
party in its own right, is a dominant factor as, its worst performance more than 
doubles its parliamentary strength and its best more than sextuples it.  
Taking into consideration that: it is a party positioned in the right/far-right with an 
anti-immigration agenda and rhetoric, it raised an unconstitutionality claim trying to 
defeat the Bill, it voted against the Bill solidly, and was the most fervent discussant on 
aggregate; it is safe to estimate that any securitization indices would be more heavily 
present here in their MPs’ statements. Also, since PASOK (center-left) and SYRIZA 
(left) voted in favor, KKE (left) abstained, and ND (center-right) voted against, these 
same manifestations should follow and increasing presence travelling from the left to 
the right on the political spectrum. 
Karyotis and Patrikios, briefly mention that ‘official discourse concerning 
migration in Greece became highly securitized’ as of the early 1990s.115 In their 
example, 
‘Discourse analysis reveals a strong offensive language towards immigrants, 
which served as the main legitimizing factor for restrictive policy responses.’ 
(…) ‘The foundations for the securitization of migration in Greece were laid 
down with the introduction of the ‘Law for Aliens’ of 1991 (Law 1975/1991). 
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Which came to replace the previous law dating back to 1929.’(…)116 
They bring up that the sponsor of the ‘Law for Aliens’ of 1991 used ‘the world 
‘problem’ twenty-eight times in total’. The use of the world problem is indicative of 
the securitization discourse. Other indicative language used by ‘political elites’ of the 
time included, ‘metaphors, exaggerations, inaccuracies, and a criminalization of the 
‘Other’ actively promoting the construction of migration as a threat, as opposed to a 
multidimensional social phenomenon.’117 Language here is seen again as a principal 
agent. 
The observation that they make on the securitizing nature of political 
discourse in Greece serves their study as an introductory bridge to their main focus, 
which is the assessment of the securitizing nature of religious discourse in Greece. 
Although this is dissimilar to my search for indications of securitization in the 
parliamentary discussions on the Bill, it is useful in identifying terms and notions to 
use and build upon for the search, such as: problem, metaphors, exaggerations, 
inaccuracies, criminalization, threat. 
Examining the securitization of migration by political elites in the Biritish 
Parliament, Huysmans and Buonfino distinguish between ‘the politics of exception’ 
and ‘the politics of unease’, as (at least) two formats for the securitization of 
migration. The former ‘focuses on the state of threat for the life of the nation, the 
legitimacy of exceptional policies justified by this threat and the ensuing tradeoff 
between security and liberty that it produces’. The latter, 
‘invests insecurities in a less pronounced way. It does not focus on existential 
threats to the territorial and functional integrity of the state but connects a 
variety of different policy areas such as welfare provisions, counter-terrorism 
and illegal migration through the discussion of policing technologies.’118 
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The authors compare the two and contend that  
‘focusing on counter-terrorism debates, to which the politics of exception are 
central distorts the understanding of the securitizing of migration and asylum. 
It tends to underplay the importance of the politics of unease, which plays a 
significant role in the securitizing of migration and asylum, which do not 
depend on references to terrorism.’119 
They take many debates on terrorism over a span of four years from 2001 to 
2005, cross-reference for ‘immigration, migration, migrant, asylum-seeker, refugee, 
bogus and foreigner’ and 
‘read for meaning, structure, and connection with other themes. The purpose 
was to understand whether and how the debates constructed the link between 
terrorism and immigration and/or asylum and what they told us about the way 
the political elite framed insecurity in the societal area. (Their) analysis, thus, 
does not seek to evaluate the constitutive or causal impact of parliamentary 
language on security or migration policy; not because this is deemed 
unimportant but because (they) were primarily interested in something else.120  
Huysmans and Buonfino demonstrate that ‘migration and asylum were very visible in 
the justification and contestation of counter-terrorism’ only in the beginning, whereas 
later on it faded considerably. This is in great part due to the fact that the political 
elite is cautious enough not to ‘insert and sustain the connection between terrorism 
and migration too intensely in the public realm. Migration and asylum remain 
securitized and it ‘is more multifaceted than simply suggesting that terrorism plays a 
major role in structuring (security) framings. 121 
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Table 2.4.4.a for Securitization instances within Law l.3838/2010 
 
 
 Problem Inaccuracies – 
exaggerations 
Criminalization Metaphors – 
exaggerations  
Threat – 
to the 
nation 
National 
Security 
Exceptional 
– emergency 
state 
Terrorism 
– counter-
terrorism 
No. of times 
relevant 
words are 
mentioned 
in Law 
l.3838/2010 
0 0 0 [15] 0 0 0 [9] 0 0 
Total number of document’s articles: 31, pages: 12, and words: 8598 
 
 
 Clouding 
Language 
Blanket 
Amnesty 
EU Discord Welfare threat Policing Economic 
plus 
Socio-cultural 
plus  
No. of times 
relevant 
words 
Mentioned 
in Law 
l.3838/2010 
0 [11] 0 [32] 0 [6] 0 0 [6] 0 [2] 0 [11] 
Total number of document’s articles: 31, pages: 12, and words: 8598 
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Table 2.4.4.b for Securitization instances within parliamentary discussions on 9th, 10th, 11th, 16th March 2010 
 
 Party Problem Inaccuracies – 
exaggerations 
Criminalization Metaphors – 
exaggerations  
Threat – 
to the 
nation 
National 
Security 
Exceptional 
– emergency 
state 
Terrorism 
– counter-
terrorism 
No. of 
times 
relevant 
words are 
mentioned 
in the 
minutes  
K.K.E. 11 - - - - - - 1 
SY.RIZ.A. 3 - - - - - - - 
PA.SO.K. 110 8 - 8 - - - 1 
N.D. 119 13 - 22 2 2 25 1 
LA.O.S. 34 34 8 56 7 5 27 1 
Total 277 55 8 86 9 7 52 4 
Total times MPs took the floor: 158 
 
 
 Party Clouding 
Language 
Blanket 
Amnesty 
EU Discord Welfare threat Policing Economic 
plus 
Socio-cultural 
plus  
No. of 
times 
relevant 
words are 
mentioned 
in the 
minutes 
K.K.E. 11 - 12 - - 5 2 
SY.RIZ.A. 8 - 3 - - 2 9 
PA.SO.K. 31 5 17 4 24 24 58 
N.D. 64 22 17 11 18 3 7 
LA.O.S. 73 20 12 20 9 - - 
Total 197 47 61 35 51 29 76 
Total times MPs took the floor: 158 
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My approach in inquiry is evidently quite different from these two authors, as 
I take what is essentially one debate (albeit in three sessions) on the specific theme of 
immigration, and try to locate and evaluate the parliamentary language in it that 
constitutes its securitization and as they put it ‘read for meaning, structure, and 
connection with other themes’. Although their study is different in its complexity, it is 
also valuable in identifying terms and notions to use and build upon for my search, 
such as: terrorism, threat to the nation, exceptional state, welfare provisions, illegal 
migration, policing. 
The two tables proposed note the manifestations of securitization language 
located and evaluated within law 3838/2010 on one (Table 2.4.4.a) and within the 
parliamentary discussions on the other (Table 2.4.4.b). 
The abovementioned studies offered certain terms/notions, which I incorporate 
as columns for the indices sought, and add a few more. I further suggest certain 
proxies for these, in order to allow for cultural/linguistic parity in the search. I 
searched for some of these proxies from the onset, but also incorporated a few new 
others, which appeared informative when going through the minutes, such as the 
“Albanian – Turkey – Islamist factor” for example. The columns read as follows 
(proxies are in the parentheses): 
• Problem 
• Inaccuracies – exaggerations (as exaggerations or misprepresentaions of the 
presence of migrants with reference to big or extraordinary numbers of) 
• Criminalization (of immigrants; references to thieves, frauds, killers-ings) 
• Metaphors – exaggerations (references to Homeland, appeals to Patriotism, 
Nationalism, accusations of espionage, Albanians’ Turkey’s and Islamists’ 
suspect covert plans and roles) 
• Threat – to the nation 
• National Security 
• Exceptional – emergency state (under attack, at war, appeals for measures and 
leeway to circumvent the normal political process i.e. unconstitutionality 
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claim, law repeal/rollback, disbelief/disregard for human rights122) 
• Terrorism – counter-terrorism 
• Clouding Language (using language such as: “smuggle-immigrants”, illegal-
immigrant, asylum, refugee, “us” vs. “them”, all of which cloud the issue and 
the targeted “other”; mutliculturism is considered negatively)123 
• Blanket Amnesty (a negative accusation of legalizing,  “Greek-izing” and 
making Greek, or naturalizing those undeserving of it) 
• EU discord (attack on EU/Europe not showing solidarity and calls for a real 
common European burden-sharing response and policy, attack on Dublin II 
Regulation124) 
• Welfare threat (or financial threat with references to taking undeserved 
welfare provisions and pensions, rising hospital costs, jobs taken from Greeks, 
illegal -untaxed- commerce i.e. peddling) 
• Policing (appeals to pubic safety/order, calls for stircter policing and border 
patrols, more active Frontex engagement) 
Until here all searched terms/notions have negative connotations, following a 
securitizing language that objectifies people as problems, threats, targets or 
undeserving burdens etc. Two more columns are proposed in order to see if there is a 
counterintuitive (to securitization) trend to consider the positive effects of 
immigration on the economy and on society and culture. 
• Economic plus (references to positive effects on the economy as immigrants 
would pay taxes and pension contributions, take care of low-end jobs that 
locals do not want to do, open up the market for high-end jobs, investments, 
commerce, bring new skills to the econmy or aquire new skills themselves) 
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 Deportation is considered normal political/administrative process and is thus not used 
123
 Smuggle-immigrant(s) is a word in Greek commonly used in reference to irregular 
migrants. It is considered to be derogatory, and its use is immediately contested/securitized.  I 
did not use migrant/immigrant, as it was omnipresent and thus unhelpful to identify 
contestation. 
124
 Which puts (uneven) pressure on point-of-entry member-states (as Greece) to examine 
asylum applications and accept returns of asylum seekers caught in transit in other member-
states. 
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• Socio-cultural plus (references to positive effects on society and culture as 
immigrants would assist in demographics –brith rate increase and thus 
population stabilization, offer cultural diversity, and portray Greece as a 
tolerant, open society, considering mutliculturism and naturalization 
positively) 
The same column format is applied to report on both the law and the debate 
minutes. For the law, I note the number of times relevant words (column titles and/or 
proxies) are mentioned in it, and check against its total number of articles, pages, and 
words. For the parliamentary discussions I note the number of times relevant words 
(column titles and/or proxies) are mentioned per party. I use the party as an aggregate 
speaker (thus allowing for the multiple times MPs spoke) and check against the 
relevant words mentioned in total per column, and the 158 times MPs took the floor. 
The parties are listed top to bottom for their orientation, left to right, on the political 
spectrum. 
The question set was to what extent deliberation over immigration policy, at 
the national level fits within the securitization discourse. If migration law were to be 
securitized, this essay would expect to see the use of securitization language as being 
very important for the wording of “the letter of the law” to begin with. Additionally, 
we would expect to see its manifestations more so in the parliamentary debates where 
the ‘party line’ is voiced and recorded, along with more evidence of this at the right of 
the political spectrum (that is right wing, far-right wing MPs/speakers). For 
securitization to come full cycle and be at top veracity all three elements (language, 
measures, leeway) should be present, but I anticipate finding more language than 
actual measures and leeway. 
After reviewing the results on Table 2.4.4.a, it is safe to say that contrary to 
what would have been expected, securitization and its language is not very important 
for the wording of this particular law. Textual analysis and word search within the 
document, suggests that securitization has not gripped “the letter of the law”, and this 
is evident as all entries are zero. In those windows were we do see numbers in 
brackets, it is to show exactly that even when these words or proxies appear, it is not 
in a securitizing manner. 
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They are used out of practical necessity to describe provisions of the law and 
its articles, in a should/should-not fashion, which follows the language patterns used 
in positive law formation and wording. For example, one should not have: been 
convicted of a crime, committed an action against state or public security etc. The 
same is true in the two columns considering the positive effects of immigration on 
economy, society and culture, where one migrant should: have integrated or paid 
social-security contributions etc.125 All accounts of legalization or naturalization, are 
simply neutral procedural and/or legal references. Any EU mentions are made to 
indicate the article’s (and/or provision’s) accordance, instead of discordance, to EU 
law/practice/aquis. Terminology is used appropriately as intended in order to clarify 
circumstances, instead of contesting the term or issue.  
Securitization instances rendered in Table 2.4.4.b were examined in text and 
context for meaning, structure, and connection between the themes offered as column 
titles and proxies. My expectations for the parliamentary debate materialized in part, 
as securitization language, when manifest, came increasingly from the political parties 
of the right. Most manifestations, as compared to the times MPs took the floor, were 
recorded, at the ‘Problem’ and ‘Clouding Language’ columns, and the least for 
Terrorism. 
On the other hand, LAOS (right/far-right) performance was surprisingly under 
par in two areas where, equally as surprising, ND and PASOK, turned the tables. This 
was the case in attaching the problem brand to immigration, where ND and PASOK 
almost tied (119-110) and LAOS came a very distant third (34). PASOK led 
references to policing and gathered as much as the other two together. Competition 
between PASOK and ND (as interchanging parties in government) to frame the 
debate, and reassure the audience that they are governing/governed on the right track, 
could potentially explain this outlier behavior. The same may also explain airing 
grievances for the EU’s lack of solidarity. 
KKE and SYRIZA performed mostly as expected, with outliers having 
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 Again, since it is a positive law should/should-not formulation, we cannot posit that the 
letter of the law produces positive connotations, but we can assume that the spirit of the law is 
infused by them. 
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rational explanations. SYRIZA indicated early on that it would support the law, and 
would invite an even more progressive approach. It’s under the securitization-radar 
flight, came as expected. It very scarcely engaged the securitization language, in order 
to scold the others for using it; so did KKE, which also added its anti-NATO/anti-EU 
rhetoric to the discordance with the EU. The party’s lone reference to counter-
terrorism was to caution that a strict policy might make it difficult to allow entry to 
revolutionary figures, accused as terrorists in their countries of origin. 
LAOS lived up to the expectations it built as the most vocally strong party in 
its own right (Table 2.4.3.b). Indeed, it was a dominant factor in seven areas of 
inquiry, was alone on criminalization, and kept up to par in all but the 
abovementioned. Also as expected126, its MPs offered no positive reasoning for 
immigration. Class struggle and the right to work inspired KKE positive calls for 
immigration, whereas human rights discourse did so for SYRIZA. ND was passively 
cautious, while PASOK was convincingly determined, to push forward its project for 
a new positive order. 
I consider safe to deduce that language is most important and evident in 
framing the migration debate and consequent party positioning and rationalization, 
while this is not the case for policy formulation that is the “letter of the law”. Overall, 
securitization language (more than measures and leeway) was present approaching a 
state of emergency, exception or unease, and more evidence of this was manifest at 
the right of the political spectrum. Measures indicating justification as a state of 
emergency, and appeals for leeway to maneuver/circumvent the normal political 
process, were neither presented nor granted. Our Democratic institutions appear 
strong enough not to allow this skid. We thus return to the Copenhagen School’s 
speech act dictum that sees the framing of the issue in security language as enough 
proof of its securitization, which I subscribe to. 
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 Since the last two columns are a counterintuitive excercise to the rest on securitization, 
positive expectations/plans should run from lower on the Right to higer on the Left . 
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Conclusion 
This thesis set out to study the securitization of migration at the level of the 
state, the individual, and the EU theoretically, and empirically at the national level, 
particularly having Greece as a case study. The theoretical part addressed key issues 
related to the securitization of migration, examining securitization theory as a base, 
and then the interplay between the state and the EU and the state and the individual. 
Focusing on human security as an alternative construct that can further our 
understanding of both the security and the immigration debates, along with “do no 
harm” policies of the EU, brought an end to the theoretical section 
The empirical part set out to answer the question of whether and to what 
extent deliberation over immigration policy at the national level fits within the 
securitization discourse. The levels of analysis where the discourse its self, that is the 
language used, public opinion, the law that the Greek government introduced and 
passed in parliament (Law l.3838/2010), and the parliamentary debates on it. We find 
out that the language used by different actors is increasingly that of securitization 
which builds on a confusion of terms that it fuels as in a vicious cycle, so as to 
confirm the otherness of immigrants towards which our society securitizes. Greek 
public opinion falls certainly within the securitization climate, and furthermore 
informs the securitization debate with important examples of Language and Leeway. 
Textual analysis of the particular law and the debates disconfirmed our anticipation of 
security language being very important to its wording, and confirmed expectations for 
the importance of security language for the parliamentary debates and more so for the 
political parties of the right. 
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Afterword 
While, one might argue, a process of de-securitization, had begun to appear, 
posing the question whether it had to do with the progressive politics of the Socialist 
party that came to office after the recent 2009 elections, there are now signs that this 
process stopped and may be overturned. Several developments have taken place. 
First the Greek government asked Frontex to intervene in assistance of Greece 
at its eastern border with Turkey, to start sharing the burden of border control. 
Frontex sent RABITS (Rapid Border Intervention Teams) with guards, equipment and 
troops127. Second, and more drastic in terms of political communication, Greece will 
be erecting a barbwire and metal reinforced wall at its land / river border with Turkey.  
This raises questions about its unwavering commitment to the protection of 
human security, and those in need of international protection and asylum. Critical 
questions have been raised by the European Commission along with cautions by the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, and more recently, by the European 
Court of Human Rights128. The question to ask is whether such an extreme measure 
has now moved into the mainstream in Greece. 
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 Frontex is the EU agency created as a specialized and independent body tasked to 
coordinate the operational cooperation between Member States in the field of border security 
‘Frontex Operational Office Opens in Piraeus’, 
‘Frontex to Deploy 175 Specialist Border Personnel to Greece’, 
‘Frontex RABIT Deployment to Greece Extended Until March 2011’ 
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 ‘Greek plan for border fence attacked’, 
‘UNHCR urges EU and FRONTEX to ensure access to asylum procedures, amid sharp drop 
in arrivals via the Mediterranean, Briefing Notes, 10 December 2010’, ‘UNHCR urges EU 
investment in asylum support for Greece, Briefing Notes, 26 October 2010’ 
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